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A B S T R A C T
Small-scale ﬁsheries are an important source of livelihoods, particularly among poor coastal populations. To
improve ﬁsheries’ condition and maximize their contribution to human welfare, co-management approaches
have proliferated worldwide. In this article, we conduct a systematic review of academic literature to examine
the context and attributes of co-management initiatives in small-scale ﬁsheries, and their expected outcomes.
The review suggests that a supporting legal and institutional framework facilitates the emergence of co-man-
agement, because it contributes to clarify and legitimize property rights over ﬁsh resources. It is also found that
co-management delivers both ecological and social beneﬁts: it increases the abundance and habitat of species,
ﬁsh catches, actors’ participation, and the ﬁshery’s adaptive capacity, as well as it induces processes of social
learning. Furthermore, co-management is more eﬀective if artisanal ﬁshers and diverse stakeholders become
involved through an adaptive institutional framework. However, the review also suggests that more research is
needed to discern when co-management initiatives can transform pre-existing conﬂicts, challenge power
asymmetries and distribute beneﬁts more equitably.
1. Introduction
Small-scale ﬁsheries support the livelihoods of many coastal com-
munities around the world (Kittinger et al., 2013). Ninety percent of the
world’s ﬁshers are directly involved in small-scale ﬁshing, i.e. about 34
million people, and another 100 million are involved in related activ-
ities (Béné et al., 2007; FAO, 2016a, 2016b). However, these ﬁsheries
face growing threats such as overﬁshing, competition with industrial
ﬂeets, water pollution, destruction of ﬁsh habitats, and an increasing
human population and demand for land in coastal areas (FAO, 2016b).
Increasing ﬁshing pressure is leading to a reduction of marine biodi-
versity, which will over time make ﬁsheries less resilient in a changing
global climate (Brander, 2007). These threats are coupled with a lim-
ited capacity of many governments to develop and support manage-
ment models that suit the multispecies character of small-scale ﬁsheries
and the numerous and dispersed landing sites characterizing them
(Allison, 2001; Kolding et al., 2014).
The co-management of small-scale ﬁsheries has emerged as a re-
sponse to these threats and challenges, proliferating worldwide over the
last decade (FAO, 2016b). Co-management promotes the joint man-
agement of the ﬁsheries’ resources by direct users, governments and
other actors (Armitage et al., 2007a; Berkes, 2009). It is regarded as a
participatory management model able to foster the sustainability of
ﬁsheries in biological, social, and economic terms (Costanza et al.,
1998; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; Jentoft, 1989; Muñoz-Erickson et al., 2010;
Pinkerton, 1989). Co-management can contribute to meet both ﬁsheries
and conservation objectives in marine ecosystems (Worm et al., 2009).
It has also been shown that co-management can deliver greater beneﬁts
to local communities in both terrestrial and marine protected areas
because, by strengthening tenure rights and decision-making processes,
it can result in increased and more equitably shared economic beneﬁts
(Oldekop et al., 2016).
A previous review of industrial and artisanal ﬁsheries (Gutiérrez
et al., 2011) identiﬁes a number of co-management attributes that are
conducive to positive outcomes, including the presence of community
leaders, strong social cohesion, individual or community ﬁsh quotas,
and community-based protected areas. A meta-analysis focused on
small-scale ﬁsheries (Evans et al., 2011) demonstrates that co-
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management results in positive impacts on ﬁshers’ income and other
sources of material wellbeing, as well as on the ﬁshery’s ecological
condition. The study also shows that co-management improves social
participation, compliance with the ﬁshery’s management rules, and
local control over resources while reducing conﬂict. These ﬁndings
echo others who previously argued that co-managed ﬁsheries enhanced
social equality (Loucks et al., 2003), resulted in more legitimate norms
that better ﬁt local conditions (Jentoft, 1989), fostered responsibility
among resource users (Nielsen and Vedsmand, 1999), and reduced
management costs (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005).
Further, in a context of climatic changes related to sea level rise,
ocean temperature change and ocean acidiﬁcation, which might modify
coastal ecosystems and ﬁsh species’ range and behaviours (Savo et al.,
2017; Wong et al., 2014), the adoption of adaptive management prin-
ciples can be critical for the sustainability of small-scale ﬁsheries in the
near future. Flexible, innovative and experimental management prac-
tices could in this context strengthen co-management initiatives and
improve the capacity of the social-ecological system to better cope with
uncertainty and surprise (Armitage et al., 2007b; Olsson et al., 2004).
Our systematic review builds on and contributes to co-management
literature by examining the links between context, attributes and out-
comes of co-managed small-scale ﬁsheries through the lens of Ostrom’s
framework for the analysis of social-ecological systems (Mcginnis and
Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 2009, 2007), which we complement with other
indicators from adaptation and co-management literature (Basurto
et al., 2013; Cinner et al., 2012; Ernst et al., 2013; Gutiérrez et al.,
2011; Partelow, 2015; Plummer et al., 2014, 2012; Plummer and
Armitage, 2007a; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007). To our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst review of co-managed small-scale ﬁsheries that includes
adaptive management attributes to test how such attributes aﬀect
outcomes. Speciﬁcally, we ask: Which are the context and attributes of
co-managed small-scale ﬁsheries? Which outcomes does the co-man-
agement of small-scale ﬁsheries result in? And, how are the context and
attributes inﬂuencing co-management outcomes? By answering these
questions, we contribute to a better understanding of how co-managed
small-scale ﬁsheries work as complex social-ecological systems while
suggesting ways to improve their performance.
In what follows we introduce the analytical framework, explain the
systematic review’s protocol, and present our results organized ac-
cording to our three questions. We ﬁrst characterise the context and
attributes of co-management, and we ﬁnd that co-management usually
develops in contexts of natural resource management decentralization,
where co-management contributes to move away from an open access
condition and it supports the creation of a new property regime and
more legitimate management rules. Second, we show that co-manage-
ment results in positive social and ecological outcomes overall, while its
ability to resolve pre-existing conﬂicts, address power asymmetries or
distribute beneﬁts more equitably is less certain because these issues
are scarcely reported in the literature reviewed. Finally, when looking
at which context and attribute variables might be inﬂuencing co-man-
agement eﬀects, we ﬁnd that involving a diversity of actors and im-
plementing adaptive management practices contribute to more positive
outcomes. We discuss these and other ﬁndings in the light of relevant
literature and we conclude by emphasizing the potential of co-man-
agement to foster the sustainability of small-scale ﬁsheries and by
highlighting research gaps.
Fig. 1. A framework for the analysis of co-management in small-scale ﬁsheries.
Each of the four variable domains includes variables and may also include categories (in bold). In the outcomes domain, underlined words with variables underneath
refer to variable groupings. Variables without superscript specify variables from Ostrom’s framework (Ostrom, 2009, 2007), superscript a speciﬁes variables adapted
from Ostrom’s framework by other authors, superscript b speciﬁes variables included in other works (Basurto et al., 2013; Ernst et al., 2013; Gutiérrez et al., 2011;
MacNeil and Cinner, 2013), superscript c speciﬁes variables adapted from Ostrom’s framework, and superscript d speciﬁes our own proposed variables.
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2. Analytical framework and methods
2.1. Analysing co-management outcomes in small-scale ﬁsheries
Ostrom’s framework for the analysis of the sustainability of social-
ecological systems (Mcginnis and Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 2009, 2007)
provides a coherent and robust set of variables to analyse how attri-
butes of a resource system, the resource units, the users, and the gov-
ernance system aﬀect interactions and resulting outcomes. We adapted
the framework to better ﬁt the study of small-scale ﬁsheries co-man-
agement, following previous related research (Basurto et al., 2013;
Cinner et al., 2012; Ernst et al., 2013; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; Partelow,
2015) and including indicators from literature on the adaptive man-
agement of social-ecological systems (Plummer et al., 2014, 2012;
Plummer and Armitage, 2007a; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007; Thiel
et al., 2015).
The resulting analytical framework contains: 1) basic information,
2) context, 3) co-management attributes, and 4) outcomes (Fig. 1).
Basic information includes key geographical and ecological descriptors
of the ﬁshery, while context variables refer to the resource system, re-
source unit, governance system and users. Co-management attributes are
split across ﬁve categories (including Ostrom’s interactions variables):
co-management features, interactions and decision making, participation,
networks, and adaptive management. Finally, outcomes encompass an-
other four groupings: ecological, process, socio-economic and generic
outcomes, each containing some self-added variables speciﬁc to small-
scale ﬁsheries’ co-management. We have excluded from our analysis the
two sets of variables from Ostrom’s framework that refer to related
ecosystems and social, economic, and political settings since almost none of
the articles reviewed included information on their respective variables
(e.g., climate trends, economic development or demographic trends,
among others).
We deﬁned most context and co-management attributes as categorical
variables, deserving either a ‘yes/no’ or a closed list of given responses
during the review process, whereas a few others were numerical vari-
ables (e.g. area of the system, number of users). Outcomes variables
were also considered categorical, most including three possible an-
swers, i.e. ‘same, increased, and decreased’ or ‘no, positive, and negative’,
and a few with a ‘yes/no’ option. The description of each variable and
its possible values are provided in Appendix A.
2.2. Data sources
We grounded this article on well-established guidelines for the de-
velopment of systematic literature reviews (Collaboration for
Environmental Evidence, 2013; Petticrew and Roberts, 2006). To
identify relevant research articles and book chapters to be included in
the review, we conducted a keyword-informed search in Scopus and
Web of Knowledge using the following strings: 1) For Scopus: TITLE-
ABS-KEY (co-management OR comanagement OR “collaborative man-
agement”) AND ALL (“small scale ﬁsh*” OR “local ﬁsh*” OR “tradi-
tional ﬁsh*” OR "artisanal ﬁsh*” OR “subsistence ﬁsh*”) AND ALL
(“natural resourc*” OR biodiversity OR conservation OR ecosystem OR
environment), and 2) for Web of Knowledge: TOPIC: (comanagement
OR co-management OR “collaborative management”) AND TOPIC:
(“Small-scale ﬁsh*” OR “local ﬁsh*” OR “traditional ﬁsh*” OR “arti-
sanal ﬁsh*” OR “subsistence ﬁsh*”) AND TOPIC: (“natural resourc*” OR
biodiversity OR conservation OR ecosystem OR environment). These
searches targeted all articles and book chapters published until De-
cember 2015 (Fig. A.1 in Appendix A). This rendered 544 publications
in Scopus and 186 in Web of Knowledge. After bringing them together
and eliminating duplicate entries, our dataset encompassed 626 articles
and book chapters.
The two ﬁrst authors screened the abstract of all manuscripts and,
when necessary, the full text based on four inclusion criteria: 1) the
focus of the case study was a small-scale ﬁshery; 2) the ﬁshery was co-
managed, i.e. governed by at least local users and a government actor;
3) the study described a change in at least one variable within the four
dimensions of outcomes considered by our analytical framework, i.e.
ecological, process, socio-economic, and generic; and 4) the study was
empirical and based on ﬁrst-hand collected data (Fig. A.2 in Appendix A
for more information on the criteria appraisal process). As a result of
this screening process, 556 out of the 626 manuscripts were discarded
and our dataset was reduced to 70 articles.
2.3. Data collection and analysis
The 70 articles were split among the co-authors and the data col-
lected was organized in a shared Excel ﬁle, in which each row had the
information of one case study, since one article could include more than
one case study. The ﬁrst two columns indicated the article number and
reference, i.e. author(s) and year, and the following columns were de-
voted one to each variable, starting with the variables of basic in-
formation, and followed by the categories resource system, resource unit,
governance system, users, co-management features, interactions and deci-
sion-making, participation, networks, adaptive management, ecological
outcomes¸ process outcomes, socio-economic outcomes, and generic out-
come. For each outcome category described in the reviewed articles, we
also recorded information on the assessment methods.
To ensure consistency in data collection, the ﬁrst two authors re-
viewed ﬁve randomly selected articles separately. The inconsistencies
between the two authors were discussed among all authors and con-
sensus was reached on how to document and code each variable.
During data extraction, three articles were discarded because they in-
cluded repeated case studies that were better described in other articles.
The ﬁnal dataset for the analysis included 67 articles, which in turn
referred to 91 case studies (Table A.2 in Appendix A).
Data analysis included three steps. First, categorical variables were
quantiﬁed, when possible, by assigning to each response a numeric
value. Second, we generated absolute frequencies and percentages for
each variable. Third, we employed pairwise Fisher exact tests to test
associations between co-management context and attributes (in-
dependent variables), and outcomes (dependent variables) (Tables A.3
and A.4 in Appendix A). For those variables that showed signiﬁcant
associations in the Fisher exact tests (p≤ 0.1), we conducted multi-
nomial logistic regressions to examine their individual and aggregated
eﬀects on each outcome variable.
To complement the analysis, we created variable groupings. Within
co-management attributes, we created a group of variables called ‘adap-
tive management’ by integrating the variables adaptive co-management,
systems orientation, interaction, integration, innovation¸ experimentation,
reﬂection and ﬂexibility. This group was meant to test whether one or
more variables of adaptive management had any eﬀects on outcomes. In
turn, within the outcomes dimension, we created several variable
groupings at three levels: 1) a set of 11 groups (see underlined text in
Fig. 1) that gathered related variables, 2) four groups that gathered the
variables of the four outcomes categories, and 3) one broad group of all
outcomes.
The creation of these variable groupings was aimed at testing
whether context and co-management attributes had any eﬀects on these
groupings. For instance, the grouping ‘species’ was the result of bringing
together the variables size, abundance and diversity, being species equal
to 1 (improves) if at least one of the variables in this group improved
and none of them worsened; equal to –1 (worsens) if at least one of
these variables worsened and none improved; and equal to 0 (neutral) if
at least one variable did not change and none improved or worsened or
one worsened whereas another improved. The grouping ‘ecological
outcomes’ included the groups species and functions, being ecological
outcomes equal to 1 if one group improved and the other one did not
worsen; equal to –1 if one group worsened and the other one did not
improve; and equal to 0 if one of the groups did not change whereas the
other did not improve nor worsened or one group worsened whereas
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the other improved. Likewise, the grouping ‘outcomes’ included the four
dimensions groups: ecological, process, socio-economic and generic out-
comes. None of the multinomial logistic regressions with more than one
independent variables yielded signiﬁcant results because of the low
number of reported variables in many case studies.
3. Results
3.1. Basic information and context
The 91 cases of our dataset spread across 37 countries, mostly
around the Paciﬁc (Table A.5 in Appendix 1). Chile and Fiji have nine
and eight cases, respectively, while the Solomon Islands, USA and Brazil
have six case studies each and the Philippines, ﬁve (Fig. 2).
Although context variables are not evenly reported across case
studies (Fig. 3 and Fig. A.3 in Appendix A for a comprehensive list of all
context variables), the results of the most reported variables provide an
overview of the characteristics of the dataset. Variables reported in
more than 75% of the cases are ﬁshery type (mentioned in 88 cases), post
access rights (76), resource type (73), operational rules (72), co-manage-
ment in law (71), previous access rights (70), and previous institutions (68).
Co-management is most reported in ﬁsheries with a multispecies
character, as it is shown in 57 cases versus 16 cases where the ﬁshery
only targets one species. Co-management is mostly adopted in coastal
(61 cases) rather than in inland ﬁsheries (23), whereas oﬀ-shore ﬁsh-
eries are rare as they represent only one case. Co-management in-
itiatives target above all shellﬁsh (39) and ﬁnﬁsh (34), although a few
cases also report resources such as algae, marine mammals or reptiles
(11). Co-management seems more likely to crystalize in countries with
favourable national legislation (67) and well-deﬁned operational rules
(68). However, there are also four cases where co-management has
been established without a supporting legal framework and another
four cases where operational rules are lacking.
Most cases report the ﬁshery’s previous property rights regime (60
out of 91). Before the establishment of co-management, most ﬁsheries
were an open access regime (31 cases), or they were managed through
territorial use rights (21) and species ﬁshing permits (8). With the
embracing of co-management, 35 cases report the implementation of
territorial use rights, nine the use of ﬁshing permits for targeted species,
and 12 the combination of both territorial use rights and ﬁshing per-
mits. Among the reviewed cases, one ﬁshery returned to an open access
regime after the co-management initiative failed, and seven continued
to operate in an open access regime but experienced diﬃculties to en-
force regulations. The reviewed cases indicate that co-management
initiatives happen mostly in ﬁsheries that were previously managed by
the government (33 cases) or the local community (25), ﬁve cases had
both governmental and local institutions and ﬁve more cases report the
absence of previous institutions.
In 50 cases, the authors mention that the co-management initiative
has evolved in a context of state-driven natural resource management
decentralization. However, only 35 of these cases describe what kind of
decentralization has taken place: 20 are inserted in a wider process of
resource rights’ devolution to local governments; seven are part of
ongoing eﬀorts to delegate more resource management powers to local
government oﬃcers; ﬁve represent a transfer of rights to local civil
society organizations or private enterprises; and another three consist
of transferring management responsibilities to governmental regional
and ﬁeld oﬃces.
There are other context variables deﬁning the characteristics of the
co-managed small-scale ﬁshery, but these are less frequently reported
and should thus be interpreted with caution. For instance, only 33 cases
document the area of the ﬁshery, which usually does not reach
1000 km2 (26 cases), and 35 ﬁsheries have boundaries that are clearly
deﬁned by biophysical conditions, such as ﬁsheries in a lake or around
an island. In eight cases, these boundaries are not so clear. Thirty-seven
case studies explicitly acknowledge that the co-managed ﬁshery over-
laps with a marine protected area while another 13 explicitly indicate
that they do not overlap with any kind of protected area.
The presence of ﬁshers’ cooperatives or unions is stated in 38 out of
41 cases referring to this variable. Only 32 (out of 40) and 39 (out of
46) cases document enforced sanctions and functional monitoring sys-
tems, respectively, which is surprising given the need to monitor co-
management initiatives as a means to understand their outcomes. The
ﬁsh resource was overharvested before co-management in 42 of the 50
cases reporting on this variable. In 13 cases, the resource is only har-
vested in the ﬁshery under study, whereas in 28 it is also ﬁshed outside.
In our dataset, only one case reports a ﬁshery without local economic
value whereas 55 cases report that ﬁsh has economic value -beyond
subsistence, and other cultural values-, and 14 of these emphasise that
ﬁsh is traded in regional and/or international markets.
Whenever mentioned, ﬁshing is the primary income source for users
in most case studies (58 out of 61 cases), but there are often other
Fig. 2. Location of the case studies in world’s regions.
Sources: GADM database of Global Administrative Areas (http://www.gadm.org/) and UN’s Standard country or area codes for statistical use (M49) (https://unstats.
un.org/unsd/methodology/m49).
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sources of income reported (16 out of 24 cases). Artisanal, commercial
and subsistence ﬁshing are the most common ﬁshing practices, men-
tioned in 63, 55, and 53 cases of our dataset, respectively. Industrial
and recreational ﬁshing are reported in only 6 and 9 of the 91 cases.
The presence of indigenous ﬁshers is explicitly described in 31 cases
whereas 11 cases explicitly report their absence.
Fifty-four cases in our dataset make explicit mention to the ex-
istence of illegal ﬁshing practices, and only ﬁve highlight the absence of
Fig. 3. Number of cases studies reporting context variables with yes/no answers (Fig. A.3 in the Appendix A for the whole set of context variables).
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such practices before co-management was introduced. Conﬂict is
documented in 31 cases and inexistent in 16 cases. Causes of conﬂict
are varied, but these are mostly caused by contested property rights
and/or management rules, or by resource competition and uneven de-
cision-making power. By contrast, although relatively few cases men-
tion social cohesion and trust in existing leaders (27 and 29 cases, re-
spectively), most of these cases report the existence of these variables in
the described ﬁsheries (23 and 21 cases, respectively). In this regard,
users often share a long history of resource use (53 out of 56 cases) and
an understanding of the social-ecological system (25 out of 27 cases).
3.2. Co-management attributes
Co-management initiatives usually aim to fulﬁl between one and
four goals. Among the 70 cases reporting goals (77% of the cases re-
viewed), the most mentioned seek an improvement of the management
process of the ﬁshery, namely: to increase participation in management
(29 cases), to increase legitimacy and/or compliance with ﬁshing rules (19),
to deﬁne or enforce ﬁshing rights (19), and to incorporate customary
management norms in formal management (18). Only one case has the
explicit objective of resolving existing conﬂicts in resource manage-
ment. Ecological, socio-economic and generic goals are much less re-
ported, with 24, 8 and 8 cases, respectively (Table A.6 in Appendix A
for the whole set of objectives). Given the expected adaptive nature of
co-management, it is surprising that only 15 cases indicate that goals
have changed over the course of the initiative while 21 have main-
tained the same goals (Fig. 4).
The co-management initiatives included in this review have been
established relatively recently. Out of the 79 cases reporting their years
of existence (87%), 63 have existed for 20 years or less. The oldest
documented initiatives are seven cases in Fiji that have been running
for 58 years. Some articles document very young initiatives, such as
those in St. Lucia, Brazil and the Philippines which had run for two
years.
The stage of co-management is reported in 84 cases (92%): 53 state
that co-management is well implemented, 22 report initiatives that are
still being implemented and nine describe partnerships that have con-
cluded. Among the latter, ﬁve were short-term development projects,
another three were not able to continue due to a lack of government’s
commitment and support, and one could not handle the ecological
variability of the ﬁshery, which in turn led to resource depletion after
three years of co-management. Half of the co-management partnerships
(46 cases) involve only users’ representatives and governments,
whereas the other half include third party organizations (45), such as
NGOs and research centres, which provide expert knowledge (Fig. 5).
Interaction and decision-making attributes are much less reported.
The regime, or the main actor promoting co-management, is mentioned
in 66 cases (73%). Twenty-nine of these have the community as the
main promoter, 25 the government, nine an NGO, two a research centre
and one a private company. Forty-one cases in our dataset highlight
that actors are willing to participate in co-management, whereas in nine
cases they are not.
The most common power-sharing scheme is cooperative, which has
been developed in 17 cases where government and users share, in
theory at least, equal power (ﬁnd the deﬁnitions of all variables in
Table A.1, Appendix A). An advisory scheme is present in another 16
cases, where governments endorse the decisions of the users.
Informative, consultative, or instructive power-sharing arrangements are
described in four, nine and two cases, respectively. Forty-one cases note
that there is a lead actor who supports local involvement in co-man-
agement, which is considered lacking in another six cases. Finally,
conﬂict-resolution mechanisms are documented in 31 out of 41 cases.
Although a diversity of actors is theoretically important to nurture
the co-management partnership with diﬀerent perspectives, experi-
ences and knowledge systems, this is scarcely reported in our dataset. In
this regard, the most documented variable in the participation category
is the existence of a diversity of interests (37 cases, 41%), while other
sources of diversity, such as knowledge, gender and age diversity are
reported in only 23, 22, and eight cases, respectively. In the networks
category, a bridging organization supporting cross-scale interactions,
i.e. vertical links across the involved actors, is mentioned in 38 cases
and lacking in three cases (reported by 45% of the dataset cases),
whereas a bonding organization supporting cohesion among partici-
pants, i.e. horizontal links, is described in 18 cases and lacking in ﬁve
cases (reported by 25% of the dataset cases). Twenty case studies ex-
plicitly aﬃrm that government and users had collaborated before co-
management was introduced, whereas in 14 cases they had not (re-
ported by 37% of the dataset cases).
Finally, only 14 cases analysed are explicitly characterised as
adaptive co-management, but interestingly 59 of the total sample (65%)
describe at least one characteristic of adaptive management. These in-
clude initiatives with a systems orientation approach, i.e. management
that recognises and accounts for human-environment complex inter-
actions (reported in 30 out of 33 cases reﬂecting explicitly on this
variable), integrating diﬀerent perspectives, approaches and knowledges
(31 out of 36) and facilitating deliberative interactions among actors (29
out of 36). Case studies applying ﬂexible norms (21 out of 32) and ex-
perimental management actions (16 out of 22), which are also key
characteristics of adaptive co-management, are less often reported.
3.3. Outcomes
The reviewed cases show an improvement of all outcome groups:
ecological, process, socio-economic and generic. However, the number of
cases reporting each outcome varies (Fig. 6 and Fig. A.5 in Appendix A
for the whole set of outcome variables). Ecological outcomes improve in
29 of the 40 cases reporting such outcomes (44% of the cases). The most
reported ecological outcomes are abundance of species (29 cases),
which increases in 20 cases, decreases in ﬁve and does not change in
four, and habitat for nesting, breeding and feeding (15 cases), that in-
creases in 10, decreases in three and does not change in two cases.
Process outcomes are the most reported and improved outcomes.
They are stated in 88 cases (97%) and have a positive impact in 72. The
single most reported outcome is participation, mentioned in 71 cases.
Participation improves in 67 cases, worsens in 1 and remains equal in 3.
Participation increases mostly in what concerns decision-making pro-
cesses, but it also increases in problem-solving forums and monitoring
activities. Social learning improves in 41 cases, worsens in three and
does not change in four. Most improvements of social learning take the
form of strengthened agreement on social norms, increased knowledge
of the management rules, as well as of expanded shared understanding.
Other aspects of social learning, such as changing policies where un-
sustainable resource management routines might be rooted, ques-
tioning governing norms that might contravene co-management ob-
jectives, or improving the ecological knowledge of the ﬁshery across all
participant actors, are less reported. Local ﬁt, i.e. the congruence of
management norms with local knowledge, norms and conditions, in-
creases in 39 cases, decreases in two and remains equal in six.
Improvements mostly happen in the form of increased alignment of
management practices with local ecological conditions, followed by
improved correspondence with local knowledge and with local norms.
Finally, 34 cases highlight that compliance has increased with co-
management, four mention a decrease and 10 describe no changes.
Socio-economic outcomes are less reported and show the least po-
sitive results, only improving in 23 of the 39 cases referring to these
outcomes (43% of the dataset cases). The most reported outcome is
catches (24 cases) either at a ﬁshery, community, cooperative or in-
dividual level. After the implementation of co-management, catches
increase in 16 cases where this issue is reported, decrease in six and do
not change in two. Impacts on income are reported in 17 cases, of which
income increases in 14 and decreases in three of these.
Finally, generic outcomes are the least reported, with only 34 cases
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making explicit reference to any of such outcomes (37% of the dataset
cases). Adaptive capacity is the most reported (22 cases), and it is re-
ported to increase in 16 of these cases and to decrease in 6. Wellbeing
(16 cases) is reported to increase in 14 of these cases and does not
change in two. Finally, vulnerability (7 cases) is reported to increase in 5
of these cases, to decrease in one and to remain the same in one of the
cases.
The only three outcome variables reporting more neutral and ne-
gative eﬀects than positive are conﬂicts (42 cases), power asymmetries
(14) and distributional equity (12), yet these variables show low re-
porting levels. Twenty dataset cases explicitly report that conﬂicts do
not change, 14 describe a decrease of conﬂicts and 8 report an increase.
Fig. 4. Number of cases studies reporting key co-management attributes with yes/no answers (Fig. A.4 in Appendix A for the whole set of co-management attributes).
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Only 29 cases describe the actors involved in these conﬂicts, including
grievances among users (10 cases), users and government (12 cases),
users and other actors (two cases), and users, government and other
actors (ﬁve cases). Existing power asymmetries are reduced in four
cases of the dataset, reinforced in three of the cases and ignored by the
co-management initiative in seven cases. Finally, distributional equity
increases in ﬁve cases of the dataset while remains the same or worsens
in four and three cases, respectively.
The level of achievement of the goals stated by each co-management
initiative is not always measured in the correspondent articles (Fig. 7).
The goal to deﬁne or enforce ﬁshing rights is the most commonly assessed
and realised in practice: Nineteen of the cases in the dataset report this
goal, with 15 cases indicating positive outcomes and one being neutral.
If we exclude the goals stated in only one or two cases of our dataset
(i.e. dealing with conﬂict, or maximising equity), the following least re-
ported goal is to address illegal ﬁshing, with only three of the dataset
cases referring to it and indicating a negative result.
Sixty-six cases (i.e. 73%) provide information on research design.
Most of them (54 cases) are grounded on an analysis of the ﬁshery’s
state compared to baseline information, which is commonly collected
through users’ perceptions (44) and, to a lesser extent, through expert
consultation (27). Twenty-three cases collect and contrast data between
study sites and control groups and in two cases data are estimated on
the basis of past records. Twenty-nine cases use secondary sources of
information to complement ﬁrst-hand empirical ﬁndings; these sources
are scientiﬁc articles (17) and reports and newsletters (24) (Fig. A.6 in
Appendix A to ﬁnd this data disaggregated by outcomes categories).
3.4. Explaining co-management outcomes
Results from both Fisher test and multinomial logistic regressions
show some signiﬁcant results that shed light on existing interactions
between co-management context, attributes and outcomes (Table 1 and
Tables A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A). The most inﬂuential variable in the
expected outcomes is the diversity of interests represented in the co-
management initiative. Engaging a diversity of stakeholders in the co-
management partnership is likely to result in more positive outcomes
overall, and process outcomes particularly (13.50 times more likely and
8.67 times more likely respectively) than to remain constant (no
change). Also, engaging actors that represent the socio-economic di-
versity of the ﬁshery is related with increased compliance (p≤ 0.05).
Our statistical analysis also suggests that the existence of operational
rules, such as quotas and temporal restrictions, can facilitate social
learning (p≤ 0.05). Existing rules are often discussed and reﬁned by co-
management participants, resulting in e.g. increased collective knowl-
edge of the dynamics of the ﬁshery, more agreement on rules, more
agreement on desirable behaviors towards natural resources, and other
characteristics of social learning. Surprisingly, we also observe that the
presence of an intergovernmental organization in the co-management
partnership hinders the creation of multilevel networks (p≤ 0.05), and
the presence of community representatives lowers the chances of re-
ducing conﬂict (p≤ 0.05). The latter might be explained by the fact that
conﬂicts are more likely to surface when community interests are
brought to the fore through the interaction of their representatives in
the co-management regime. We would suggest that unearthing all ex-
isting conﬂicts in co-management forums is necessary to deal with them
successfully over time. The former result is less intuitive, and it may be
explained by the fact that our dataset is small and only three cases
report the existence of intergovernmental organizations.
The analysis also suggests that if the targeted species is shellﬁsh,
socio-economic outcomes are more likely to remain constant than to
worsen (0.05 times more likely) or to improve (0.10 times more likely).
The presence of industrial ﬁshing in the ﬁshery constrains species’ size,
diversity and abundance (p≤ 0.05), and is also likely to impinge ne-
gatively on cooperation, which might not increase as a result (p≤ 0.05).
However, if there is artisanal ﬁshing, resource management legitimacy is
more likely to improve with the establishment of co-management
(p≤ 0.05). Our analysis also suggests that when illegal ﬁshing is
Fig. 5. Co-management partnerships involving users
and governments (A) and involving users, govern-
ments, and third actors (B).
Numbers on the bottom of the bars indicate number of
case studies. Other combinations refer to local and re-
gional governments, regional and national governments,
and local, regional and national governments. NGOs and
another actor refers to NGOs and an intergovernmental
organization, a research centre or a company. Other ac-
tors refers to intergovernmental organizations, third-
country governments, multi-stakeholder bodies at regional
level, and companies.
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reported, ecological outcomes are more likely to improve (29.98 times
more likely) than to remain constant. Taken together, these results
suggest that involving artisanal ﬁshers in co-management may result in
more legitimate outcomes, while industrial ﬁshers might have fewer
incentives to cooperate for the conservation of ﬁsh stocks. Finally, when
co-management includes one or more practices of adaptive management,
the adaptive capacity of the ﬁshery increases (p≤ 0.05) and the like-
lihood of conﬂicts to appear or increase is reduced (p≤ 0.1).
Fig. 6. Number of case studies reporting outcome variables.
Bars indicate how many of the case studies reporting a given variable do so positively, negatively, or indicate no change.
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When co-management replaces centralized decision-making frame-
works, it seems more eﬀective in reducing conﬂicts and addressing
power asymmetries. Co-management might also deepen power asym-
metries when it replaces previous community-based systems (Table 2).
However, given the reduced number of cases in the dataset that report
on these variables, such relationships appear statistically non-sig-
niﬁcant.
4. Discussion
The results section has provided evidence on the key context and
attributes of co-managed small-scale ﬁsheries, their most relevant
outcomes and the interrelationships between context, attributes and
outcomes. Here we ﬁrst synthesize and discuss the main ﬁndings, and
we subsequently reﬂect on two elements that underpin our systematic
review: the spatial distribution of the case studies reviewed and the
potential of our review framework to advance the research frontier on
the co-management of natural resources.
The most reported context variables in our dataset suggest that co-
management often occurs in coastal small-scale ﬁsheries with previous
open-access conditions targeting a diversity of species, in a context of
decentralized natural resource management, and with a supportive
legislative framework that includes clear operational rules, such as
quotas and closed-seasons. Most of the initiatives included in the review
have been running for 10 years or less, share equal power between
government and users or empower users very signiﬁcantly, while half of
them include third parties, usually NGOs and research centres.
Communities or government often take the lead in promoting co-
management, and throughout the process there is often facilitative
leadership provided by a guiding individual or organization. Although
not evenly reported throughout the reviewed case studies, it seems that
co-management can be a platform for knowledge generation and ex-
change across scales, as expected from a multi-level governance scheme
(Vodden et al., 2005).
Our review also suggests that co-management can be a conduit to
the sustainability of small-scale ﬁsheries. Our analysis indicates that
76% of the reviewed cases document one or more positive outcomes,
whereas 17% produce mixed results and 7% fail in achieving goals.
These ﬁndings are in line with other scholarly work, which considers
ﬁsheries co-management largely successful in achieving both social and
ecological objectives (Cinner et al., 2012; Gutiérrez et al., 2011). Evi-
dence from the few cases of the dataset reporting on ecological out-
comes suggests that co-management can make targeted species more
abundant and improve their habitat. Combining diverse management
approaches and technologies, such as gear restrictions, catch reduction,
and closed areas, co-management contributes to the restoration of
marine ecosystems and rebuilds ﬁsheries (Worm et al., 2009). In line
with co-management theory, a relevant number of the dataset cases
report an improvement of stakeholders’ participation in management
and other process outcomes, such as increased compliance, enhanced
social learning, and improved local ﬁt. A reviewed case study, for ex-
ample, describes how the participation of local users in the design of the
management plan of Indonesian coastal ﬁsheries strengthened the
congruence of management norms with local ecological conditions and
resulted in increased compliance and the banning of very harmful
ﬁshing techniques (Crawford et al., 2004).
Other theorized, process-related outcomes of co-management, such
as conﬂict resolution, remain poorly reported and point to mixed re-
sults. For example, Ho et al. (2016) show that the Vietnamese gov-
ernment implemented a co-management regime in the Tam Giang La-
goon, where the newly created ﬁshery associations were successful in
mediating and improving recurrent conﬂicts over resource access. This
subsequently led to better ecological and social outcomes. In contrast,
Nursey-Bray and Rist (2009) show how the incorporation of indigenous
cultural aspirations, including traditional hunting of endangered spe-
cies, into the management framework of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef
Marine Protected Area resulted in more rather than less conﬂicts be-
tween indigenous peoples, tourist operators and local residents. These
two examples suggest that the potential of co-management to resolve or
mitigate conﬂicts should not be taken for granted (Béné et al., 2009;
Gelcich et al., 2006).
Only one of the case studies reviewed explicitly acknowledges that
the reduction of conﬂict was a key goal of the initiative studied. This is
somewhat surprising since co-management should, by deﬁnition, bring
together diﬀerent stakeholders in joint decision-making forums and, as
a result, unearth existing conﬂicts or facilitate new conﬂicts to emerge,
particularly when community representatives play a more central role
in ﬁsheries’ management. This could be regarded as a desirable out-
come since conﬂicts might reﬂect the fact that historically marginalised
management perspectives had been brought to the fore. Furthermore,
conﬂicts can create the conditions for new knowledge and sustainable
practices to emerge (Keen et al., 2005; Matulis and Moyer, 2017).
However, conﬂicts can also destroy long-term collaboration pro-
cesses, and thus should be taken up and addressed seriously (Lee,
1993). One important source of at-sea conﬂicts are grievances between
artisanal and industrial ﬁshers because the latter are more eﬃcient in
extracting the resource and often destroy artisanal ﬁshing equipment
(DuBois and Zografos, 2012). In this review, the most reported reason
for conﬂict is competition among user groups and, although only eight
cases mention the presence of industrial ﬁshers, who can have a
Fig. 7. Number of case studies measuring or not outcomes related to their stated goals, with speciﬁcation of whether the outcomes are positive, neutral or negative.
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negative impact on the ﬁsh stocks and prevent users’ cooperation. These
results call for the inclusion of industrial ﬁshers, when applicable, in the
co-management partnerships in order to better handle any potential
conﬂicts, strengthen cooperation, and facilitate user groups to operate
under the same governance mechanism and regulations, since artisanal
ﬁshers often follow locally established norms whereas industrial ﬁshers
operate within the context of formal government rules (DuBois and
Zografos, 2012). This would hopefully facilitate the eventual achieve-
ment of improved ecological outcomes. Our statistical analysis also
suggests that conﬂict can be prevented and diminished by strength-
ening users’ collective action and community institutions that promote
cooperation and equitable outcomes and ensure a more adaptable
management system to changing conditions (Ratner et al., 2017).
As for conﬂict, socio-economic outcomes, such as changes in income,
catches, power asymmetries and equity are also rarely explored in depth
in the dataset cases. And, whereas the few cases reporting income and
catches mostly show an increase of these two variables, case studies
reporting on power asymmetries and equity show rather mixed results.
For instance, our review suggests that if power asymmetries within the
local community are not addressed by the co-management scheme, the
most powerful actors can have greater inﬂuence on co-management
outcomes (Adger et al., 2005; Davis and Bailey, 1996), leading to the
uneven distribution of both income and other beneﬁts (Barnaud and
van Paassen, 2013). Whereas equity is theorized to increase with co-
management (Plummer and Armitage, 2007b), previous case-based
studies show both improved and worsened distribution of co-manage-
ment beneﬁts among local ﬁshers (Cinner et al., 2012; García Lozano
and Heinen, 2016). Therefore, future research needs to provide more
evidence on the role of co-management in dealing with conﬂicts, power
asymmetries and equity. Speciﬁcally, more evidence is required to test
if co-management is more eﬀective in reducing conﬂicts and addressing
power asymmetries when it devolves management rights to local users
after the failure of centralized management approaches, or when it
replaces traditional systems of resource use and management (Armitage
et al., 2007a; Berkes, 2010; Russell and Dobson, 2011).
The scarce reporting on outcomes other than speciﬁc process out-
comes can be explained by the fact that most initiatives reviewed are
short-lived, recently implemented or in the implementation phase,
which probably made it diﬃcult for researchers to observe signiﬁcant
changes in ecological conditions and ﬁshers’ wellbeing aspects that
require longer periods to crystallise (Yang and Pomeroy, 2017). Paying
more attention to ecological, socio-economic and more generic out-
comes, including the status of ﬁsheries’ species, changes in income and
catches, and users’ material, knowledge and political conditions seems
paramount. Ideally, these analyses should draw on panel and long-
itudinal data collected through multi- or inter-disciplinary research.
The results of our systematic review additionally hint at the im-
portance that social diversity in co-management plays in determining
co-management outcomes. The statistical analysis suggests that the
presence of artisanal ﬁshers and the absence of industrial ﬁshers, as
well as the existence of clear operational rules, are the context condi-
tions that support the most successful co-management initiatives. These
ﬁndings complement, rather than contradict, the other enabling context
conditions identiﬁed by previous studies which enhance co-manage-
ment success, including local leadership, social cohesion, governance
capacity, quotas and protected areas (Gutiérrez et al., 2011; Selig et al.,
2017).
Our review also indicates that partnerships involving all stake-
holders and accounting for their socio-economic diversity seem more
able to enhance compliance with agreed rules and achieve better
management outcomes than those partnerships involving only local
leaders. This is consistent with the view that ensuring representative-
ness, and sharing both power and beneﬁts translates into more sus-
tainable outcomes (Jentoft, 2007; Pascual et al., 2014). A key challenge
for co-management theorists and practitioners is developing co-man-
agement initiatives involving multiple actors with diverging values,Ta
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interests and goals, in order to implement more legitimate management
arrangements whilst eﬀectively dealing with potential conﬂict (Ratner
et al., 2012). In this regard, our review suggests that partnerships im-
plementing adaptive management practices, such as a ﬂexible co-
management structure that can quickly respond to signals of environ-
mental change (e.g. McCay et al., 2014) or experimenting with new
management tools to replace previous failed management systems (e.g.
Crawford et al., 2010), are better able to prevent conﬂicts and to in-
crease the adaptive capacity of the ﬁshery.
As for other systematic reviews conducted to evaluate emerging
environmental policy frameworks (Plummer et al., 2012; Wamukota
et al., 2012), our results should be taken with caution. Our dataset is
limited in scope, with case studies selected only from international and
English-written peer-reviewed scientiﬁc articles. If we had reviewed
scientiﬁc research published in multiple languages, as well as grey lit-
erature published by research programs or the co-management in-
itiatives themselves, we would have probably come up with a much
larger and complete dataset of case studies worldwide. Such dataset
would have in turn enabled us to test for some multivariable cause-and-
eﬀect relationships that we were not able to perform in this article due
to the high number of unreported variables.
Our data selection bias also probably explains the gaps observed in
the distribution of case studies, with a surprising lack of studies in
western and southern Africa, many Central and South American coun-
tries, and large parts of Asia, e.g., China and Russia, which might have
nonetheless been reported in non-English written academic journals.
The rather patchy distribution of the reviewed cases is probably the
result of research funding aimed at investigating speciﬁc development
and policy programmes. In Eastern Asia, co-management research
seems to respond to a need to evaluate development projects promoted
by international donors. For example, two cases in the Philippines
(Baticados and Agbayani, 2000; Kuperan et al., 2008) were developed
under the International Collaborative Project on Fisheries Co-manage-
ment, funded by the Danish International Development Agency, and the
case in Laos (Baird and Flaherty, 2005) fell into the Environmental
Protection and Community Development in Siphandone Wetland Pro-
ject, funded by the European Union. In North America, interest in co-
management research stems, primarily, from an interest in under-
standing ﬁsheries management involving First Nations groups: six of
the nine cases located in Canada and the USA involve indigenous
ﬁshing groups. Seemingly, in Africa, most studies focus on eastern
countries’ initiatives, with the research being led or organized by USA
and UK researchers and funding programs. In turn, the relatively higher
density of case studies in Chile and Brazil might be explained by the
research interest that arose in response to the Chilean ‘management
areas for the exploitation of benthic resources’ and the Brazilian ‘ﬁshing
agreements’ programs, which respectively promoted co-management in
ﬁsheries.
In spite of these methodological caveats, we think that the review
results and its underlying analytical framework have considerable
value. By innovatively combining insights from existing frameworks for
the analysis of social-ecological systems (Mcginnis and Ostrom, 2014;
Ostrom, 2009, 2007) and adaptive resource management (Plummer
et al., 2017), we have provided a rather comprehensive map of all re-
levant variables for the study of co-management approaches, which can
be further complemented with some additional variables from
emerging literature. Selig et al. (2017), for example, have found that
variables like the human development index and lower coastal popu-
lation density can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the ecological eﬀectiveness of
resource management initiatives. This “analytical map” can be used to
conduct future reviews, but also to guide ﬁeldwork research in well-
established or new co-management initiatives.
5. Conclusions
Small-scale ﬁsheries co-management is a research ﬁeld of growing
interest. This systematic review demonstrates that co-management in-
itiatives are more likely to develop in coastal and multispecies ﬁsheries
with an enabling legal and institutional framework, and that co-man-
agement is usually a way to clarify property rights. Co-management
beneﬁts from involving a diversity of actors, and it faces the challenge
of doing so while strengthening cooperation, dealing with conﬂict and
achieving ecological outcomes, particularly when community re-
presentatives and industrial ﬁshers are involved. This review shows that
adaptive management can contribute to the prevention of conﬂict and
increase the adaptive capacity of small-scale ﬁsheries. The review
conﬁrms that co-management can result in more solid management
institutions, as well as in positive ecological and social outcomes, in-
cluding increased ﬁsh abundance and catches, the participation of
diﬀerent actors in resource management, and in an increased adaptive
capacity of the ﬁshery. However, the review also reveals that empirical
research on co-managed small-scale ﬁsheries has to date paid in-
suﬃcient attention to the social-ecological context underpinning co-
management initiatives, as well as the latter’s attributes. Additionally,
research has been uneven in systematically recording of the outcomes
of co-management, with more attention being paid to process out-
comes.
We expect that the framework we have developed to conduct this
review can guide future research. The use of a multi-variable and multi-
dimensional framework to organise the review has allowed us to
identify at least three key research domains that require further at-
tention. First, there is a need to investigate the extent to which co-
management is eﬀective in resolving existing grievances or buﬀering
against potential new conﬂicts and in balancing power asymmetries
and the distribution of resource management beneﬁts; second, it is
critical that future studies shed light on whether the performance of co-
management initiatives is sensitive to the nature of the pre-existing
management system; and, third, it is important to examine in which
ways the involvement of third party actors in co-management aﬀects
the type of outcomes and their distribution and sustainability over time.
In doing so, future research needs to target case studies where co-
management has been implemented for at least 10 years and carefully
examine both social and ecological goals. If we expand the evidence
base in these three key areas, we will be able to better understand the
ways in which co-managed small-scale ﬁsheries beneﬁt both ﬁsh spe-
cies and ﬁsherfolk, now and in the future, in a context of global climate
change and increasing pressures on coastal ecosystems.
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